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Tenured Faculty and the "Uncapped" Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
John H. Burton, Jr.*
After 1993, college and university professors will have an almost
unlimited lease on the ivory tower. The Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA or the Act)' has been "uncapped" to protect
workers above 70 from discrimination based on age.2 While an ex-
ception to this coverage now allows the mandatory retirement of
tenured faculty at age 70, the Act will begin to prohibit such com-
pulsory retirement of tenured faculty after 1993.3 Older faculty
members who do not retire may then create a logjam at the top of
the faculty hierarchy, causing significant financial and structural
problems for colleges and universities. Without mandatory retire-
ment, a large group of minimally active, but highly compensated,
older faculty may strain institutional resources, inhibit the prospects
of women and minorities for employment and advancement, and
even threaten academic quality if incompetent or nonperforming
faculty members become too difficult to remove. Since any change
in a tenure system takes years to reach its full effect, colleges and
universities must plan now for the ADEA-induced retention of post-
70-year-old tenured faculty.
* The author wishes to thank Ralph S. Brown and H. Irvin Penfield for their valua-
ble assistance in the preparation of this Current Topic.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
2. Since employers with 20 or more employees are affected, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)
(1982) (defining "employer"), most colleges and universities will be subject to the new
uncapped ADEA. Five states already bar age-based mandatory retirement in public and
private employment. Only Wisconsin, however, prevents such a practice from being
applied to all workers older than 40 including tenured faculty members and fails to pro-
vide the traditional defenses to an age discrimination suit. Ruebhausen, Age as a Crite-
rion for the Retirement of Tenured Faculty, 41 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 16, 41 (1986).
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, §§ 6(a) and 6(b), Pub.
L. No. 99-592, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (99 Stat.) (to be codified at
29 U.S.C. § 631). Section 6(a) now reads:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any
employee who has attained 70 years of age, and who is serving under a contract of
unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited tenure) at an in-
stitution of higher education [as defined by section 1201 (a) of the Higher Education
Act of 1965].
Section 6(a) is terminated at the end of 1993 by section 6(b).
The definition of "institution of higher education" is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1141(a)
(1982). For the purposes of this Current Topic, the terms college and university are
used interchangeably to denote institutions meeting this statutory definition.
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Any changes in tenure systems will not be without costs, given the
important functions tenure performs within the academic commu-
nity. Tenure traditionally has been and will continue to be essential
for academic freedom, particularly in this world of "McCarthyism,
student revolts, racial and religious intolerance, intolerance toward
alien ideologies, the rise of 'creationism,' the environmental move-
ment, the controversies over nuclear power and nuclear weapons,
and the increasing public control of colleges and universities."4 Ad-
ditionally, tenure systems provide the job security that helps com-
pensate for low salaries in academia as compared with private
industry and encourages academic freedom. 5 As the policies of
both Congress and universities demonstrate, tenure is a complex
and delicate institution meriting strong deference in formulating
any alternative employment scheme.
The major concern motivating the ADEA is, of course, to protect
all older workers from age discrimination. 6 The fundamental prem-
ise behind the decision to lift the upper age limit is that "[f]reedom
from discrimination based on age is no more inherently defensible
at age 70 than at age 65." 7 At the same time, concern about the
effects of uncapping on higher educational institutions prompted
Congress to phase in this provision for tenured faculty over seven
years, enabling colleges and universities to plan for the new retire-
ment trends that would result. 8 The phase-in provision was the re-
sult of a compromise; while some in Congress opposed special
treatment for tenured faculty, others felt that even a seven-year ex-
emption would not provide enough time for institutions to adapt. 9
4. H. Bowen &J. Schuster, American Professors: A National Resource Imperiled 236
(1986).
5. Id. at 236-37.
6. While the Act permits age to be used as a criterion of employment in some situa-
tions, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1982), it cannot be used as the only criterion without proper
justification, such as public safety. See Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414
(1985) (age can be used as a bona fide occupational qualification if an overriding interest
in public safety is involved and the employer is compelled to use age as a proxy for the
relative safety of a worker). For legislative history on justifications for uncapping, see
H.R. Rep. No. 756, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986).
7. H.R. Rep. No. 756, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986).
8. Hearings Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 113-
14 (1986) (staff report on mandatory retirement) [hereinafter Hearings on Aging]. Con-
gress similarly adopted a phase-in period in 1978 when it raised the mandatory retire-
ment age from 65 to 70; retirements of tenured faculty at 65 were allowed until July
1982. See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
92 Stat. 189 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634) (West 1985 &
Supp. 1987).
9. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, arguing for a longer exemption for colleges and
universities, expressed his reservations about having an exemption of only seven years:
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As a result of the compromise, the phase-in period was enacted to
give institutions a limited time "to reexamine the tenure system and
to determine, in light of the elimination of mandatory retirement,
whether structural changes might be appropriate or whether incen-
tives should be offered for voluntary retirement."' 0 This Current
Topic examines the likely effects of the ADEA and explores various
responses that colleges and universities should consider.
I. Effects of Uncapping in the College Setting
The full effects of the uncapped age limit are uncertain at this
point, since they are clearly dependent on the number of professors
who will choose to work past the age of 70.11 This number will dif-
fer from institution to institution and will be affected by the age dis-
tribution within each work force, the difference in compensation for
older and younger faculty, and the overall financial health of each
particular institution.' 2 As demographics and pay scales change
over time, the effects of the new law will also vary within each insti-
tution. If, for example, a school has a large group of faculty mem-
bers clustered around a certain age, the effects of the amendments
will become evident only when that group reaches what had previ-
ously been the mandatory retirement age. As a result of the new
law, colleges and universities must prepare for "significant and con-
tinuing changes in their faculty age distributions."' 3
Although it is impossible to predict the exact number of profes-
sors who will be affected, it is clear that the number of workers who
remain in employment beyond the age of 70 is dependent on eco-
nomic factors, particularly inflation and stock market performance.
During periods of high inflation, the prospects of living on fixed-
[T]here does appear to be a severe shortage of teaching positions available for to-
day's scholars. . . . We should be very careful, I think, about eliminating the retire-
ment age altogether, unless we can be sure that this Nation's education will not
suffer as a result." 132 Cong. Rec. S16856 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986).
10. 132 Cong. Rec. H11283 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Rep. Jeffords).
11. Potential problems with uncapping will be studied by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the National Academy of Sciences. The results of this
study, to be completed by Oct. 31, 1991, are to be given to the President and to Con-
gress. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, § 6(c). If this report
emphasizes the problems of uncapping in the college setting, Congress could conceiva-
bly extend the life of the tenured faculty exemption. Given the general support for the
ADEA, however, such an extension is highly unlikely.
12. The Impact of Federal Retirement-Age Legislation on Higher Education: A Re-
port of the Special Committee on Age Discrimination and Retirement, AAUP Bull.,
Sept. 1978, at 181-82 [hereinafter Impact of Federal Legislation]. This report was writ-
ten after the 1978 amendments raised the coverage of the Act to age 70.




income retirement benefits will convince many faculty members to
remain active, in the hope that their salaries will increase to match
any rise in prices. ' 4 In addition to inflation, stock market perform-
ance also influences the behavior of potential retirees because it af-
fects the performance of retirement pension plans. The better these
plans perform, the more attractive retirement becomes.' 5
While economic factors play a large role in the decision to retire,
subjective factors influence the decision as well. Prospective retir-
ees measure their current job satisfaction against potential satisfac-
tion after retirement. In a comparison of faculty and staff workers at
the University of Iowa, faculty members were the "most likely to
continue working beyond the point at which post-retirement income
would be larger than working income," due to the combined factors
of high job satisfaction and high requirements for post-retirement
income. 16 While tenured faculty work longer in order to maximize
later financial benefits, they also continue to work simply because
they enjoy their jobs. In the Iowa case, these subjective factors
seemed to have trumped finances; the lure of money alone did not
induce retirement.
Whatever a faculty member's rationale for foregoing retirement,
the primary fear of college administrators is that uncapping will pre-
vent colleges from ridding themselves of incompetent and/or
nonperforming faculty and thus that academic quality will be im-
paired.' 7 Advocates of mandatory retirement assert that the soon-
to-be-outlawed mandatory retirement age is a simple and effective
method of getting undesirable teachers out of the classroom.' 8 To
make their point, these advocates need not make a general claim
that performance decreases with age in all cases; they do argue,
however, that lifting the ceiling on the ADEA will simply serve to
protect the decreased performance of certain individual older work-
14. Even in times of stable prices, faculty members fear future inflation and thus
continue to work. Soldofsky, On Determining the Optimal Retirement Age, Academe,
July-Aug. 1986, at 17, 23.
15. Impact of Federal Legislation, supra note 12, at 187.
16. Soldofsky, supra note 14, at 21.
17. Protected by a tough ADEA, tenured faculty members can use the threat of age
discrimination claims to retain their positions indefinitely. See infra notes 35-55 and ac-
companying text on the difficulties of defending against an ADEA claim.
18. Matthew W. Finkin, Chairman of Committee A on Academic Freedom and Ten-
ure of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), while discounting the
problems uncapping will cause, suggests that uncapping will lead to difficulties with
some "slothful and somnolent" professors who under previous law could have been
retired. Heller, Colleges Ponder the Effects on Tenure of End to Mandatory Retirement
at 70, Chron. Higher Educ., Dec. 3, 1986, at 15, 18, col. 1.
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ers.' 9 The retention of an ineffective teacher can be particularly
devastating in a small department within an institution, or in small
institutions in general. Here, one inadequate teacher can retard the
development of an entire program. In such a situation, the elimina-
tion of a mandatory retirement age clearly damages the educational
process.
By retaining older faculty, colleges may also face a problem of
imbalance in their academic programs. If, for example, a college
finds itself with four tenured Renaissance Poetry professors when
class enrollments require only one, the college may be forced to cut
back in another area where teachers are desperately needed. Here,
college administrators face a difficult dilemma. Because of an excess
of Renaissance Poetry teachers, they are constrained by costs when
trying to staff a second area.20 If quality is to be maintained, the
second area cannot be randomly staffed with available faculty who
happen to know a little about the subject. When older teachers are
retained, colleges may find it much harder to respond to changes in
curricular demand; thus the reaction time of colleges is legally im-
peded by the new amendments to the ADEA.
An institution also may be impeded in the hiring and advance-
ment of women and minorities. While Congress, through the
phase-in exception to the ADEA, gave colleges and universities
some time to adapt to the new system by hiring and advancing wo-
men and minorities now, it is fairly certain that many institutions
will not be able to meet self-imposed affirmative action goals in the
six years between 1987 and 1993.21 After 1993, the logjam will be-
gin. With older faculty choosing to keep teaching, fewer jobs will
become vacant. 22 During consideration of similar amendments in
1978, when the retirement age was raised from 65 to 70, the Senate
Committee on Human Resources noted this problem expressly:
19. See Hearings on Aging, supra note 8, at 71 (statement of Mark A. deBernardo,
counsel for the Chamber of Commerce, on the effects of the amendments: "Faced with
the prospect of costly and protracted court battles and the handicap in such legal efforts
of plaintiffs being able to obtain jury trials and liquidated damages, many employers
simply may surrender.").
20. The institution may be protected by the doctrine of financial exigency or of bona
fide change in academic program. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
21. Some states impose hiring guidelines. See Thornell, The Future of Affirmative
Action in Higher Education, 29 How. L.J. 259, 264-68 (1986) for a discussion of affirma-
tive action in education. Because of a greatly reduced number of entry-level positions as
a result of the new ADEA, the 1990s will be bleak years for minorities and women who
hope to enter the academic world. This phenomenon will last, of course, only until the
logjam settles into a new long-run pattern of retirement at higher ages. It will probably
recur, however, in every period when the economic outlook for retirees looks bleak.




"Many colleges and universities maintain that for the foreseeable
future the number of available faculty positions will be closely re-
lated to the number of retirements, thereby making it difficult to
employ younger professors, particularly women and minorities. '"23
In other words, under the 1986 ADEA amendments, white males
hired before colleges became concerned about affirmative action
can continue to work past 70, while fewer jobs open up for everyone
else.
2 4
Most institutions are likely to be similarly concerned about the
direct financial impact of the ADEA amendments long before 1993.
Older faculty members with tenure generally have higher academic
rank and seniority than younger faculty members and thus are more
highly compensated. 25 It follows that a school that retains many
older faculty will have much higher costs. In an era when the costs
of higher education are already straining student assets and college
endowments, 26 institutions cannot ignore the potential financial im-
pact of the 1986 amendments.
In sum, the effect of the uncapped Act will be to increase pressure
from all sides-the institution, older faculty, and younger faculty.
Under the new law, the respective interests of these three groups
will inevitably clash, unless some preventive measures are taken by
institutions today.
IL Potential Institutional Responses
The ADEA-generated pressures demand prompt response from
colleges and universities. Since probationary periods before a ten-
ure award usually last several years, the policies institutions adopt
today will not come into full effect until uncapping is
implemented. 27
23. S. Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 8, 9 (1977).
24. A Department of Labor study, while claiming that the elimination of mandatory
retirement would have little overall effect on women and minorities, also noted that
uncapping would result in the retention of 195,100 older men in the workforce by the
year 2000. House Subcomm. on Health and Longterm Care of the Select Comm. on
Aging, Eliminating Mandatory Retirement, H.R. Doc. No. 561, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1986).
25. "[O]lIder faculty members approaching retirement age receive annual compensa-
tion that is approximately double that of newly hired assistant professors." Impact of
Federal Legislation, supra note 12, at 184.
26. Average charges for tuition, room, and board in 1984 at private colleges in-
creased 67% over the charges in 1978; charges rose approximately 53.5% for public
colleges in the same period. U.S. Dep't of Labor, National Center for Educ. Statistics,
Digest of Education Statistics 1983-84 141 (1983).
27. A tenure-track appointment, or probationary period, lasts for as many as 12
years, after which time a tenure review is scheduled. Special Comm. on Education and
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Before discussing specific institutional responses, it is important
to understand the mechanics of an ADEA claim available to a faculty
member. In an employment discrimination case such as an ADEA
action, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion at all
times.28 Although the plaintiff retains this burden, once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, 29 the defendant
must establish some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the ac-
tion taken.30 If such a reason is established, the plaintiff must show
that the stated reason is pretextual and that age actually was the
"determining factor" in the institution's action.3' Then the burden
returns to the defendant to prove that the reason for the action was
genuine and not, in fact, pretextual.
In addition to being procedurally complicated and morale-damag-
ing for the defendant, ADEA suits also can be expensive for the in-
stitution. Courts may award back pay, lost benefits, and liquidated
damages in cases of willful violations of the Act; punitive and com-
pensatory damages are not available.32 Attorneys' fees may also be
awarded. 33 In a situation where an employee reasonably refuses the
the Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Due Process in Decisions
Relating to Tenure in Higher Education, 39 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 392, 413 n.12
(1984)[hereinafter Special Comm.]
28. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980) (defin-
ing burden of persuasion in a Title VII action).
29. A prima facie case may be established in two ways. In a discharge situation, a
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case by establishing that: (1) plaintiff is within the pro-
tected class, (2) plaintiff met applicable job qualifications, (3) despite having met these
qualifications, plaintiff was discharged, and (4) plaintiff was displaced by someone
younger. See Grant v. Gannett Co., 538 F. Supp. 686, 688 (D. Del. 1982); Weeks, Age
Discrimination in Employment and the 1986 Amendments, 10 Lex Collegii 1, 2 (1987)
(discussion of prima facie case and burden of proof). As an alternative, a plaintiff may
establish a prima facie case under a theory of disparate impact. Under this theory, plain-
tiff "need only demonstrate that a facially neutral employment practice actually operates
to exclude from a job a disproportionate number of persons protected by the ADEA."
Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983).
30. See, e.g., Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d at 691, 692 (after plain-
tiff made out its prima facie case, defendant could not establish that its action was justi-
fied by business necessity). ADEA claims are similar to Title VII actions. See Civil Rights
Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254
(defining defendant's burden in a Title VII action).
31. See EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff challenged
company's forced retirement policies).
32. See generally Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir.
1982) (state tort claims not precluded by awards of back pay, lost benefits, and liqui-
dated damages under ADEA), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).




employer's offer of reinstatement, the court also may award "front
pay" as well. 34
Administrators may choose among several responses to claims
filed under the newly uncapped law. First, they may rely on the stat-
utory defenses listed in the ADEA. Second, if they choose to take a
more aggressive position, they may attempt to disconnect tenure
from employment in order to put an older, tenured professor on
nontenured status, thereby achieving a procedural advantage in an
ADEA case. Third, they may institute a system of post-tenure re-
view in order to strengthen their control over the quality of teaching
in their institutions. Finally, they may create new and more enticing
incentives to induce older faculty to leave their posts. This section
examines the advantages and disadvantages of each of these
alternatives.
A. Reliance on Statutory Defenses
Faced with an ADEA claim, four statutory defenses are available
to an institution: "good cause," "reasonable factors other than
age," "bona fide occupational qualification," or "bona fide seniority
system." 35 Administrators who perceive no threat from the uncap-
ping at their particular institution may decide to take no action until
an ADEA claim is filed. Where few older persons remain on a
faculty, the problems of uncapping will not be significant for that
particular institution in the near future, and hence waiting to defend
individual cases is appropriate. Other administrators, who perceive
a threat from uncapping, still may choose not to react if they feel
that the statutory defenses can adequately protect them from any
potential claims. How much protection these defenses will actually
provide, however, is questionable since the more-than-explicit in-
tent of Congress was to protect older workers and to provide only
narrowly tailored defenses. The degree of protection provided by
each defense is examined below.
1. Good cause. The defense of good cause3 6 has significant poten-
tial to protect the institution. In a clear case of incompetence or
34. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hospital, 748 F.2d 1543, 1551 (11 th Cir.
1984). Contra Kolb v. Goldring, 694 F.2d 869, 874 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982) (ADEA plaintiff
may not recover damages for future economic loss).
35. A fifth defense is that the employee was a "bona fide executive or high policy
maker" who could be mandatorily retired at age 65. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (1982). This
defense might apply in suits by college administrators or deans. Weeks, supra note 29, at
4. See EEOC v. Board of Trustees, 723 F.2d 509, 510 (6th Cir. 1983) (college president
qualifies as a "policy maker").
36. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1982).
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gross indiscretion by a dismissed faculty member, for example, the
institition should prevail in a later ADEA action.3 7
The good cause defense, however, has severe drawbacks. Clearly
any dismissal of a faculty member, including one for good cause,
creates morale problems and conflicts of interest within the institu-
tion. The primary legal difficulty in using the good cause defense
stems from the burden placed on the institution to establish those
facts necessary to show that incompetence exists or that gross indis-
cretion has occurred.38 While good cause dismissal has long been
an integral part of the tenure system, colleges have rarely used it
because of difficulties in proving the allegation involved.39 The nec-
essary inquiry can be embarrassing and difficult for academic institu-
tions, where a collegial atmosphere is prized. For these reasons
colleges rarely use this defense under the current system, and it is
unlikely that they will rely on it heavily in the future.
2. Reasonable factors other than age. A second possible defense,
known as the reasonable factors other than age defense (RFOA),40
has similar advantages and drawbacks. Applied in situations where
nothing is specifically wrong with the plaintiff, that is, no cause for
termination exists, the institution may find some relief by asserting
financial exigency as an RFOA to allow it to make cutbacks of even
tenured personnel. 4' The financial exigency excuse, however, is
strictly limited to situations in which the institution can prove a seri-
ous threat to its operation. 42 Thus it should not be claimed in cases
where a financial problem is only temporary, but rather where a
"continuing stringency" could "threaten the institution's sur-
37. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 788 F.2d 504, 509
(8th Cir. 1986) ("That he held his position for fifteen years before he was terminated for
incompetence does not prove that he performed his duties competently."); Levitt v. Uni-
versity of Texas at El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1985) (tenured faculty mem-
ber dismissed for sexual harassment), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 599, reh g denied, 106 S.Ct.
1290 (1985).
38. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text discussing burden.
39. As Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island noted during the discussions on the
ADEA, Harvard University, in the long years of its existence, has never dismissed a ten-
ured faculty member for cause. Perhaps Harvard missed its chance when it failed to
dismiss an apocryphal faculty member who "murdered his wife and went to the electric
chair with his tenure still intact." Ford, Implications of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act Amendments of 1986 for Colleges and Universities, 5J. Coll. & U. L., 161,
189 (1978-79).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982).
41. See Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 679 (4th Cir. 1978) (concept of
tenure allows dismissal based on financial exigency).
42. See American Assoc. of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 322 A.2d 846,
856 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1974), aft'd, 346 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1975) (claim




vival. ' '43 To remedy financial problems, the institution cannot dis-
criminate against older faculty members simply because they are
more highly compensated; the comparatively higher cost of a particu-
lar older faculty member will not qualify as an RFOA. 44 Nor does a
legitimate cost-related RFOA discriminate against older workers as
a class; it must be based instead on general institutional cutbacks
and program discontinuations.
Short of true financial exigency, the institution may also be able to
make a bona fide change in its academic program and thus eliminate
certain positions. 45 The loss of the positions, however, must be "un-
avoidable" because of the change in academic program. 46 While
this standard limits the use of program change as an RFOA, it could
still potentially solve the problem of the excess Renaissance Poetry
professors. In a regime of uncapping, the RFOA defense may re-
ceive more attention; it has been labeled the "forgotten defense"
among those listed in the ADEA.47
3. Bona fide occupational qualifications. Under the bona fide occu-
pational qualifications defense (BFOQ),48 the institution can defend
against an ADEA claim by showing that, because of the nature of the
job, age was a proper factor in the decision to terminate.49 A BFOQ
43. Special Comm., supra note 27, at 402.
44. In Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d at 692, the court rejected the defendant
college's cost defense, finding instead that "economic savings derived from discharging
older employees cannot serve as a legitimate justification under the ADEA for an em-
ployment selection criterion."
45. SeeJimenez v. Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363, 368 (1st Cir. 1981) (institution has "im-
plied contractual right" to terminate if position is being eliminated as "part of a change
in academic program"); deLoraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 499 F.2d 49, 50 (2d Cir.)
(withdrawal of permission for retired engineers to return to work in response to in-
creased demand was justified because demand had ceased), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009
(1974).
46. Almodovar, 650 F.2d at 368.
47. See Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative
Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other than Age Exception, 66 B.U.L. Rev. 155
(1986). While the RFOA defense provides hope of success when related to finances,
other applications have proven less effective. See EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
725 F.2d 211, 222-23 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984) ("mere eligibility
for a pension is not a defense to a prima facie case of age discrimination"). Clearly this
defense will succeed only if the defendant can demonstrate early retirement is not linked
to age. See 725 F.2d at 222 ("Westinghouse bears the burden of going forward with
evidence to demonstrate reasonable factors, other than age, justifying its action."); Mar-
shall v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant em-
ployer need not establish that RFOA criteria were applied to all other similarly situated
employees, but rather that they were the reason for this particular employee's
discharge).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982).
49. Regarding the BFOQ exception, the House Education and Labor Committee
noted that "[t]he [BFOQ] provision recognizes that certain mental or physical capabili-
ties may decline with age, so that in some jobs with unusually high demands, age can be
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is difficult for any employer to establish. Congressional intent to
limit this defense may be inferred by the conclusion in a 1986 House
Committee on Education and Labor report that "[u]sing chronolog-
ical age as a bona fide occupational qualification ... is most likely a
mistake from a legal, ethical and organizational effectiveness
perspective." 50
In addition to the barrier of legislative intent, the BFOQ seems to
hold little promise in the academic context, since most uses to date
have involved physical, rather than mental, qualifications. Courts
recognize that in the teaching context, mental skills are decidedly
more important than physical ability. 51 It is unlikely that an institu-
tion could prove a general pattern of mental deterioration in older
workers sufficient to justify an arbitrary age cutoff.52
4. Bona fide seniority system. The fourth defense would allow the
institution to establish and follow the terms of a bona fide seniority
system or a "bona fide employee benefit plan,"-53 even though the
plan may seem to have age-related effects. In creating a bona fide
program, a college can reward employees with benefits as part of its
seniority system or pension plan, as long as workers with the same
seniority status are rewarded in a similar way regardless of age. 54
Penalties for seniority, however, are forbidden. Any system that pe-
nalizes senior, older employees will be viewed as a " 'subterfuge to
evade the purposes' of the Act" and will not be considered bona
fide. 55 Compulsory retirement would be just such a penalty. Under
a factor considered in hiring and retaining employees." H.R. Rep. No. 756, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1986).
50. Id.
51. See Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1977) (because teaching is a
profession in which mental skills are vastly more important than physical ability, the
mandatory retirement of a teacher at age 65 is not rationally related to the presumed
state interest in removing unfit teachers), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979). But see Palmer
v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1978) (declining to follow Gault, the court re-
fused to distinguish compulsory retirement cases based on whether mental or physical
qualifications were involved).
52. Aggregate statistics of group performance can assist the employer in a safety
context. If an ADEA defendant could prove that it could not consider employees on a
case-by-case basis, for example, it could establish a BFOQ of age based on safety con-
cerns. See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414-15. Educational insititutions, however, cannot claim
such a safety justification, thus drastically reducing the chances of success for an aca-
demic BFOQ defense.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 623(")(2) (1982).
54. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(c) (1986) (seniority system must be applied uniformly).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(b) (1986). See Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263,
1272 n.12 (5th Cir. 1982) (although defendant argued that a sick leave payment policy
was tied to length of service, court held that defendant "may not deny an entire class of
older employees-those hired after age fifty-any participation in a fringe benefit unre-
lated to a bona fide retirement, pension, or insurance' plan simply by artificially trying to




this defense, an institution could not justify any form of compulsory
retirement of faculty with seniority.
On the whole, the statutory defenses are effective only under very
limited circumstances. Even when the circumstances seem condu-
cive to using one of the four defenses, the problems entailed in es-
tablishing that defense may be difficult for the institution to
overcome. Instead of relying solely on the defenses built in to the
ADEA, institutions should consider affirmative policy changes dis-
cussed in more detail below to prevent ADEA suits.
B. Decoupling Tenure from Employment
A more aggressive alternative to relying on statutory defenses
available to colleges and universities is the institution of reforms
that would in essence blunt the effects of the new amendments.
One such reform involves separating the institution of tenure from
the notion of employment in the hope that undesirable faculty will
then be easier to remove. Stemming from the premise that nonten-
ured faculty are more readily removable than tenured faculty, at
least from a procedural standpoint, this process of separation, called
"decoupling," puts a tenured professor on nontenured status with-
out affecting employment per se.
Decoupling can operate in two different ways. The first method
terminates a teacher's tenure-but not necessarily employment-at
a fixed, prearranged age, at age 70, for example. The second termi-
nates tenure at the expiration of a term-of-years contract, and,
again, employment is not necessarily terminated. In both cases, the
institution is then left with a second decision concerning the contin-
uance of employment.
Decoupling's value to the institution lies in its elimination of the
strategic advantages a tenured faculty member has over a nonten-
ured faculty member in removal proceedings. When faculty mem-
bers with tenure are dismissed from a state university, they are
entitled to due process, which includes a hearing.56 Nontenured
faculty at state universities, on the other hand, are not entitled to a
due process hearing on nonretention unless they can show that "lib-
erty" or "property" interests are at stake. 57 In private institutions,
the right to a hearing for tenured and nontenured faculty alike will
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56. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
57. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575, 578 (1972).
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be defined by individual contract, 58 although tenure agreements be-
tween private institutions and their faculty members are likely to re-
quire a hearing before dismissal. The dismissal hearing
requirement provides an important strategic advantage to tenured
professors.
In the institutional dismissal hearing, the university bears the ulti-
mate burden of establishing the cause for which the tenured faculty
member should be removed. The institution is thus forced at the
outset to present a reason for dismissal before any ADEA claim is
made. While tenured professors have no substantive advantage in
an ADEA claim itself, they can, through the requisite preliminary
hearing process, analyze the university's claim and develop a better
case in the event that they decide to bring suit under the ADEA.
Nontenured professors, by contrast, are in a less advantageous
position. Most dismissals of nontenured professors take the form of
a nonrenewal of contract, where the employer generally need not
show cause. 59 Without a specified contractual right to dismissal pro-
ceedings, when a nontenured faculty contract is not renewed, the
nontenured professor will have only a letter or notice of dismissal
on which to base an ADEA suit. In order to discover the reasons for
nonrenewal, the nontenured plaintiff may be forced to hire a lawyer
and file suit. A tenured professor, on the other hand, will receive a
fuller report, prepared by the institution, describing those reasons
for dismissal.
The nontenured plaintiff is at a further disadvantage because of
the way in which cause is interpreted under the ADEA. As a general
principle, cause in such cases is undefined and extremely fact-spe-
cific. It would be fair to assume, however, that for purposes of cause
an institution is likely to allow tenured professors slightly more lee-
way than nontenured faculty and to judge them less regularly or less
thoroughly on scholarship and teaching abilities. Nontenured
faculty, on the other hand, are subject to closer scrutiny by the insti-
tution. In this fashion, cause for nontenured faculty members may
not suffice as cause for tenured professors. By creating nontenured
58. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 669 F.2d 142, 151 (3d Cir. 1982) (under terms of
university employment statement, only tenured faculty possessed the contractual right
to university procedures for dismissal for cause), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982).
59. In fact, as long as constitutional rights are not violated, "a nontenured teacher
may be fired for any reason or for no reason at all." Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State
University, 665 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982);




faculty through the decoupling process, an institution may give itself
greater leeway in establishing the cause for dismissal.
Decoupling by institutions can be attempted either retroactively
or prospectively. Of the two, retroactive decoupling presents far
greater legal problems. The wording of the seven-year phase-in
provision of the ADEA suggests that only "compulsory retirement"
will be allowed during the phase-in period from now until the end of
1993. Any other change in employment status, including retroac-
tive decoupling, apparently would violate the Act.60 Thus while a
college may retire a tenured faculty member who reaches age 70
before the end of 1993 under a previously established policy, the
institution may take no other action based on age, such as
decoupling, that negatively affects that faculty member's
employment.
Retroactive decoupling of existing tenure rights also presents a
number of contractual and constitutional problems. Tenure usually
takes the form of a contract, and the termination of tenure without
cause constitutes a breach. 6' The currently tenured professor is
also protected from the arbitrary loss of tenure, at least at public
institutions, because tenure is a property right protected by the
fourteenth amendment. 62
For the current phase-in period, in which planned compulsory re-
tirement is allowed, institutions may attempt to avoid the problems
of decoupling by playing a game of semantics. Some commentators
describe decoupling as the first step in a "phase-out" retirement
process, with later aspects of the process outside the scope of the
ADEA. 63 Since a retirement is a matter of contract and is not de-
fined in the ADEA, a university could decouple tenured employees
during the current phase-in period and claim that they are "re-
tired."' 64 Then, by asserting that its subsequent relationship with
this "retired" employee is outside the ADEA's coverage, it could
reduce the employees from "nontenure to part time, and then to
complete phase-out. From the inception of the status-reduction
60. Ford, supra note 39, at 202.
61. In the absence of cause for dismissal, courts will overturn university decisions to
dismiss tenured employees. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Martine, 607 S.W.2d 638, 643
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980) ("moral turpitude" charge against faculty member was unsubstan-
tiated, thus the dismissal was improper).
62. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576, 577.
63. See Barnes & Schlottman, After "Decoupling": Further Thoughts, 9 J. Coll. & U.
L. 315, 316 (1982-83).
64. See id. at 317.
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process, the employee is considered to be on retirement.' ",65 By
defining decoupling as retirement, the institution could claim that
its action falls within the limited exception for tenured faculty,
which applies only to retirements and not to other changes in em-
ployment status. 66
Such a definition of retirement would probably not be acceptable
to a court, however, since it seems to be a clear "subterfuge to avoid
the purposes of the Act."-67 All that decoupling can accomplish
safely is to separate tenured faculty members from their tenure, not
to separate them from their jobs. The university is then left with
nontenured employees to eliminate-admittedly nontenured-but
still employees.
If the institution then dismisses or changes the employment status
of a decoupled faculty member because of age, the employee will
still have recourse against the school through an ADEA action. The
Third Circuit considered this issue in Levine v. Fairleigh Dickinson Uni-
versity, 68 where the institution decoupled Levine from his tenure at
the age of 65. Levine had continued in employment as a nonten-
ured, full-time employee until the institution failed to reappoint him
to that position. 69 In finding that the reduction in Levine's employ-
ment status from full- to part-time was covered by the ADEA, the
court's decision cast doubt on the idea that decoupling will be of
much benefit to the institution. 70 Giving deference to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's interpretation of the stat-
ute, the court noted that the Act does not "permit discrimination on
the basis of age against an employee who accepts [a nontenured po-
sition] from the institution. ' '7i The notion of tenure has nothing to
do with the ability to bring suit; the Act applies to both tenured and
nontenured employees alike.72 Thus decoupling provides no partic-
ular advantage during phase-in periods; as Fairleigh Dickinson Uni-
versity discovered in Levine; the decoupling process still leaves the
65. See id. at 318.
66. See supra note 3.
67. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(a) (1986) (concerning bona fide occupational
qualifications).
68. 646 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1981).
69. 646 F.2d at 827.
70. 646 F.2d at 832.
71. 646 F.2d at 831 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 66793 (1979)).
72. See Bompey, Decoupling Tenure and Employment under 1978 Amendments to
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 8J. Coll. & U. L. 425 (1981-82) (a discus-
sion of legislative intent regarding decoupling after the 1978 amendments, concluding
that a faculty member who voluntarily accepts a nontenured position in lieu of retire-




institution with nontenured employees who are covered by the
ADEA.
For the next few years, the ADEA exception for tenured faculty
may thus create perverse incentives. Faced with the all-or-nothing
option of compulsory retirement as allowed until the end of 1993, 73
colleges may choose (while they can) to retire professors now in-
stead of placing them on part-time status. Ironically, the ADEA may
thus serve to promote discrimination against older workers in the
short term. As the Third Circuit noted in Levine, the defendant insti-
tution, instead of putting the decoupled professor on a year-to-year
contract, "could have chosen the practice followed by other univer-
sities of completely severing the employment relationship with its
[sic] faculty members when they lose their tenured status. ' 74 Then,
the institution would not have had to face a suit based on Levine's
reduction in status; Levine would have already been retired. Since
decoupling might lead to more of an ADEA threat to an institution
than compulsory retirement, at least during the phase-in period, the
institution may respond by opting for legal retirement now instead
of facing an ADEA suit later.
In response to a well-developed ADEA suit similar to Levine, an
institution could only win if it could present a convincing statutory
defense. 75 As discussed earlier, this avenue is not promising. For
example, consider a term tenure contract, in which a professor's
tenure expires when he is 72. At age 73, he or she is dismissed--or,
more accurately, the year-to-year appointment is not renewed.
Given no other determinative circumstances, this situation looks like
a clear violation of the ADEA: The institution is affecting the status
of the employee by using age as a criterion. Even if no suit had
followed from the retroactive decoupling itself, the subsequent non-
renewal could easily appear as a violation of the ADEA's standards.
A different analysis applies, however, to prospective decoupling.
In view of the imminent uncapping after 1993, institutions should
now re-examine and change policies that will affect future tenured
faculty. One option is to decouple by creating expiring or term-ten-
ure contracts that give the institution the opportunity at some future
date to take away the tenure it had earlier bestowed. The school
could establish, for example, term-tenure contracts of 20 or 30 years
in order to maintain some amount of institutional flexibility in the
73. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
74. Levine, 646 F.2d at 833.
75. See supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text.
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face of changing needs. At the end of the term, the institution
would have the option to renew or not to renew tenure. If eventual
dismissal of the faculty member seemed appropriate to the institu-
tion, the institution presumably would choose not to renew.
Prospective decoupling does provide the institution with the pro-
cedural advantage of having placed faculty members into less advan-
tageous positions from which to make ADEA claims. Like
retroactive decoupling, however, it does not change their substan-
tive legal rights under the ADEA. Given the legal constraints to the
decoupling process, universities ought not to rely solely on this
method to prevent any ADEA-related turmoil within the institution.
C. Changes in the Tenure System
As alternatives to the complicated decoupling procedure, a school
could implement a system of post-tenure review or create a multi-
tiered tenure process. The obvious object in either case would be to
remove alleged "deadwood" from the school at periodic intervals.
Post-tenure review might operate much as current tenure review
systems work, including the use of faculty committees to evaluate
performance. This reform, however, raises numerous practical and
legal difficulties. While practical problems are also evident under
the present tenure review system, a more complex and lengthy ten-
ure process only exacerbates them. Post-tenure review requires a
demanding and time-consuming process of faculty self-assessment.
Faculty members are colleagues and quite often friends, particularly
after working together at an institution for a number of years, and
thus they could have difficulty making impartial judgments about
their peers. To some extent, this collegiality problem could be
solved by using an outside reviewing team, similar to a department
accreditation team, to assess faculty. While an outside board of re-
view might have the advantage of objectivity, it might have the dis-
advantage of having less-than-adequate information to make the
best possible recommendations. Only faculty members who are in-
timately familiar with the performance of an individual teacher and
with the standards of their particular institution can make the most
informed decisions concerning tenure.
In addition to these practical problems, fundamental legal difficul-
ties are involved for an institution that interferes with tenure rights
once they are created. 76 State law generally has followed one of two




paths concerning the legality of a post-tenure review system as ap-
plied to currently tenured faculty.77 In the first, a retroactive change
in tenure policy, applied uniformly, is permissible if found "reason-
able" by the trier of fact.78 Under the second line of authority, the
"reasonable expectations" of the academic profession would be de-
terminative of whether the change in tenure policy would be al-
lowed. 79 The reasonable standard might permit some modifications
in tenure policy, while the reasonable expectations standard could
promote policy inertia by validating only predictable changes. Post-
tenure review, while arguably a reasonable method for policing
quality, might not meet the reasonable expectations of the academic
profession, simply because it is a relatively untried idea in this pro-
fession. The retroactive change to implement post-tenure review
would run those risks under this second standard.
While the prospective adoption of a post-tenure review system
would avoid the risks of inadequate assessment and impermissibil-
ity, it nonetheless raises another serious policy question. The subtle
yet frightening threat presented by a post-tenure review system, and
indeed by any inroad on tenure rights, is the potential damage it
could inflict on academic freedom. The principle justification for
the present tenure system is to protect academic freedom.80 Any
changes that impose upon that system-or even changes that seem to
threaten the job security of college professors-might have a chil-
ling effect in academia. Professors who have to stand up to review
every few years or, worse yet, are employed on a year-to-year basis
because of an expired tenure contract, probably will be more con-
strained in their teaching, adopt more traditional methods, and find
themselves perhaps unconsciously influenced by whatever meets
current approval in the discipline. Describing the related plight of
77. M. Finkin, Uncapping the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Alterna-
tives to Tenure 19 (Nov. 21, 1985) (unpublished manuscript)[hereinafter Finkin, Uncap-
ping]. See generally Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The Case of Private Higher
Education, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 1119 (1980) (on the use of contract in private higher educa-
tion employment arrangements).
78. Finkin, Uncapping, supra note 77, at 19. See Rehor v. Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity, 331 N.E.2d 416, 421 (Ohio 1975) (change in institutional retirement age from
70 to 68, applied evenly, was reasonable, and thus earlier grant of tenure did not pre-
empt it), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
79. Finkin, Uncapping, supra note 77, at 19. See Drans v. Providence College, 383
A.2d 1033, 1040 (R.I. 1978) (court examined the expectations of the profession in de-
termining that changes in retirement policy were acceptable).
80. The AAUP 1940 Statement of Academic Principles strongly emphasizes the im-
portance of tenure to academic freedom: "Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifi-
cally: (1) Freedom of teaching and research and of extramural activities and (2) a
sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession attractive to men and wo-
men of ability." Quoted in id. at 1039.
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temporary teachers, one analyst ably argued, "The teachers who
must go, hat in hand, every year (or every two years, or every three
years) indefinitely into the future, to ask if they may stay, are not
teachers who can feel free to speak and write the truth as they see
it."8 These instructors may also feel constrained when criticizing
their institution, even constructively. Such a situation is clearly to be
avoided, and courts often recognize that fact.8 2 For this reason, in-
stitutions contemplating changes in their tenure systems can also
anticipate vehement protests from faculties and from the American
Association of University Professors.
Less drastic alterations to the present tenure process have the
same disadvantages as post-tenure review plans, although perhaps
to a lesser degree. One possible option is to create a two-tiered
tenure process. After completing the first tier, defined by a period
of years, the instructor is subject to review. Once having passed this
review, the instructor then enters a tenure-track appointment; after a
specified period, tenure is either awarded or refused. Like the post-
tenure review process, this option allows the institution more than
one formal opportunity to analyze the performance of the faculty
member. But like post-tenure review, multistage tenure policies
may also threaten academic freedom to some degree. While the sta-
tus quo tenure process admittedly muffles creativity during the
faculty member's probationary period, under a multistage system
this threat would last for a longer period of the faculty member's
career.
Although altered tenure systems provide somewhat more flexibil-
ity for institutions than the systems currently in place, they also im-
pose high costs. Before implementing any change, an institution
must balance the advantages of flexibility in faculty retention against
the disadvantages of the impairment of academic freedom and rigid-
ity in academic programs. Given the traditional weight afforded to
freedom in academia, the balance would have to tip toward the cur-
rent system, unless additional safeguards for freedom can be guar-
anteed through some sort of institutional process.
81. Townsend, Outsiders Inside Academe: The Plight of the Temporary Teachers,
Chron. Higher Educ., May 28, 1986, at 72, col. 1.
82. Faculty criticism of the institution is largely protected under the first amend-
ment. The Third Circuit found that a teacher's criticism of institutional academic stan-
dards is a matter of "public concern" and a matter "upon which it is essential that public
employees be able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal." Johnson v.
Lincoln University, 776 F.2d 443, 452 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461




D. Increased Retirement Incentives
Rather than meddling with the tenure rights themselves, an insti-
tution might choose to sweeten the retirement offer in order to in-
duce older faculty members to leave active employment. A school
can make retirement more attractive in several ways. One incentive
the school can use is financial reward. By offering a "golden hand-
shake," a bonus for leaving employment, a school could persuade
faculty members to retire. 83 As discussed earlier, financial incen-
tives such as benefits and pensions clearly affect the decision of
when to retire.84
For the institution, the size of the financial carrot will depend on
the expected savings gained by an older professor's retirement.
The greater the difference between entry level and full-professor
pay, the more an institution should be willing to offer as a bonus.
Such cost comparison can help an institution formulate appropriate
bonus levels.
A less complicated policy is to increase retiree perquisites at the
institution to make the honorary status of the professor emeritus
more attractive. Simple but meaningful benefits, such as free park-
ing and free admission to all campus events, can make life more en-
joyable for the retiree. The school can also treat the retiree as an
important part of the university community by granting access to
laboratory and research facilities and even to office space, if avail-
able.8 5 The California Conference of the American Association of
University Professors has adopted an "Emeriti Bill of Rights" that
lists privileges, some costly but most not, that would make retire-
ment a more attractive option.8 6 These suggestions include both
substantive incentives such as access to campus facilities, events,
and services, and more cosmetic suggestions such as recognition in
catalog and directory listings and invitations to participate in tradi-
tional ceremonies and other events.8 7
83. In Koman v. Sears, Roebuck, No. 84-C 5754 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1986) (LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Dist. file), the district court endorsed the legality of the "golden hand-
shake" as part of a "voluntary early retirement program."
84. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. For taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1988, tax sheltered pension plans must be nondiscriminatory as between
employees receiving low and high compensation. I.R.C. § 403(b)(10) (West Supp.
1987). Any faculty plan must meet this nondiscrimination requirement. Sumberg,
Faculty Pensions under the Tax Reform Act, Academe, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 10.
85. See Albert, Retirement: From Rite to Rights, Academe, July-Aug. 1986, at 24-26
for an account of possible retiree perquisites.
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id. at 26.
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Retirement need not be an alienating event in the career of a pro-
fessor; with cooperation from the institution, a retiree can still con-
tribute to the academic community without remaining on the active
payroll. 8s For faculty members who have spent the better part of
their lives at the institution, the reassurance that all ties will not be
severed could be enough to induce them to retire. Inclusion in in-
stitutional activities, to the extent desired by the employee and ac-
ceptable to the employer, would reduce much of the friction caused
by the abrupt separation of traditional retirement. For example, a
newly retired faculty member could be asked to participate in the
intellectual life of the institution both inside and outside the class-
room as a resource for students or as a speaker or participant in
discussions. The retiree could also be asked to assist in formulating
institutional policy without necessarily being given administrative
power or responsibility. These suggestions will not, of course, be of
any value to faculty members who enjoy classroom teaching and lit-
tle else about the position. For those who enjoyed some of the
other aspects of the job, however, this solution could induce more
voluntary retirements at an earlier age, as planned by the institution,
particularly since nonfinancial considerations are often determina-
tive in the decision to retire.8 9
Encouraging retirement will not be an effective solution if the fi-
nancial and emeritus carrots are waved in front of certain faculty
members only because of age. The ADEA cuts both ways, also pro-
tecting younger faculty from age-based discrimination. Suppose
that a 65-year-old tenured professor who has worked 20 years is of-
fered twice his normal salary to retire. A 50-year-old tenured pro-
fessor who has worked the same period and has not been offered
this same reward could be able to bring an ADEA claim against the
employer.90 The ADEA covers not only hiring and firing, but also
88. Matilda White Riley, of the National Institute on Aging, notes that older people
have much to contribute:
Added years can prolong the opportunity for accumulating experience in all do-
mains of life; they can maximize the potential for the assumption of new roles; they
can extend relationships to others--collegues, friends, kin-all of whose lives have
also been extended; they can increase the complexity of both social networks and
intellectual horizons.
Riley, On Future Demands for Older Professors. Academe, July-Aug. 1986, at 14, 15.
89. See supra note 16 and accompanying text concerning subjective considerations in
retirement decisions.
90. One purpose of the ADEA is to protect older workers, but the Act is also
designed "to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621 (b)
(1982). It follows that all workers within the protected class would be covered, even




other conditions related to employment.9 1 The institution should
take care to structure any retirement incentives in a non-age-dis-
criminatory manner, while at the same time making them appeal to
the persons it wishes to retire. The institution must offer the re-
wards on a "length of service," rather than age, basis, thus qualify-
ing the incentives as part of a bona fide seniority system.9 2
Conclusion
In responding to the looming problems caused by the 1986
amendments to the ADEA, institutions that rely on ADEA defenses
in any litigation that may arise may find these defenses difficult to
establish and unlikely to help them reach financial, academic, and
affirmative action goals. Institutions seeking active alternatives will
also find decoupling and post-tenure review schemes of little assist-
ance; both are likely to cause intractable legal problems and result
in significant harm to academic freedom. The safest option from a
legal standpoint is to create an improved system of retirement in-
centives within the bounds of the ADEA.
Improvements in the economic and psychological aspects of re-
tirement will lead to more retirements, thus satisfying the retiree
and keeping the institution out of court. The university's goal is to
persuade tenured professors to give up their lease on the ivory
tower. If educational institutions can induce the optimal number of
retirements at the proper times, they will be able to avoid the harm-
ful side effects of the ADEA's protection of the older worker.
91. "Section 4(a)(l) of the Act specifies that it is unlawful for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age." 29 C.F.R. § 860.50(a) (1986).
92. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(a) (1986). For example, a "golden handshake" given after
30 years of service could be part of a BFSS.
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